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Charitable solicitation in the U.S. is regulated by “the several 
States.”  For most of the nation’s history, charities tended to be 
local endeavors, raising money and providing relief in their 
immediate vicinities.  In the latter half of the twentieth century, 
charities increasingly grew beyond these local origins as new 
technologies enabled even the smallest charities to develop a 
national reach with direct mail and telemarketing campaigns.  
Nevertheless, primary authority for regulating charitable 
solicitations remained with the states. 
I. REGULATION BY THE STATES 
The states retain the general police power to regulate the 
solicitation of charitable contributions from their residents and 
within their jurisdictions.  Forty-three states and the District of 
Columbia have exercised this power by enacting statutes regulating 
charitable solicitations.1  Although the states posit various 
 
       †  Charles H. Nave, P.C., Roanoke, Virginia; B.A., Williams College, 1991; 
J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1999.  Mr. Nave has been assisting 
nonprofits and fundraisers in their efforts to comply with and/or challenge state 
and local charitable solicitation acts and ordinances since 1999. 
 1. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-9-70 to 13A-9-84 (1994 & Supp. 2003); ALASKA STAT. 
§§ 45.68.010 to 45.68.900 (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-6551 to 44-
6561 (West 2003); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-28-401 to 4-28-416 (Michie 2003); CAL. 
BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17500 to 17510.85, 17200 to 17209 (West 1997 & Supp. 
2004); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12599 to 12599.5 (West 1992 & Supp. 2004); COLO. 
REV. STAT. tit. 6, art. 16 (2002 & Supp. 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 21a-175 to 21a-
1901 (1994 & Supp. 2004); D.C. STAT. §§ 44-1701 to 44-1714 (2001 & Supp. 2004); 
1
Nave: Charitable State Registration and the Dormant Commerce Clause
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
NAVE(KD & CB).DOC 10/3/2004  8:56:47 PM 
228 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1 
justifications for these statutes, they typically boil down to two main 
reasons: public disclosure and fraud prevention.2  The public 
disclosures most typically sought by these statutes are disclosure of 
the purpose for which contributions are solicited and disclosure of 
the manner in which contributions are actually used.3  Although 
many statutes criminalize any violation of the Charitable 
Solicitation Act4 (which would necessarily include missing a 
deadline or failure to include the proper wording of a required 
disclosure on a solicitation device), they also clarify the meaning of 
“fraud” in the context of charitable solicitations.5 
 
FLA. STAT. ch. 496 (2002 & Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-17-1 to 43-17-23 
(2002); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 467B-1 to 467B-13 (2002); ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 460/0.01 
to 460/23 (2000); IND. CODE §§ 23-7-8-1 to -9, 24-5-12-25 (1994 & Supp. 2004); 
IOWA CODE §§ 13C.1 to 13C.8 (2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1759 to -1775 (1995); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 367.650 to 367.670 (Banks-Baldwin 2002); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 1901-1909.1 (West 1987 & Supp. 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, ch. 385, 
§§ 5001-5016 (West 1997); MD. CODE ANN., BUS. REG. §§ 6-101 to 6-701 (1992-1998 
& Supp. 2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 8 (2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 400-271 
to 400-294 (1997); MINN. STAT. §§ 309.50 to 309.72 (2002); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 79-
11-501 to 79-11-529 (1973-2001); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 407.450 to 407.489 (2001); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7:19 to 7:19-b (2001); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 45:17A-18 to 
45:17A-40 (1995 & Supp. 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-22-1 to 57-22-11 (Michie 
2003); N.Y. EXEC. LAW art. 7-A, §§ 171-a to 177 (McKinney 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§§ 131F-1 to 131F-4 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 50-22-01 to -05 (1999 & Supp. 
2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1716-01 to 1716-17, 1716-99 (West 1994 & Supp. 
2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, §§ 552.1 to 552.18, 553.3 (1999); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 
128.801 to 128.898 (2003 & Supp. 2004); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 162.1 to 162.24 
(West 1999 & Supp. 2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 5-53-1 to 5-53-14 (1999 & Supp. 
2003); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-56-10 to 33-56-200 (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 2003); 
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-101-501 to 48-101-521 (2002 & Supp. 2003); TEX. REV. CIV. 
STAT. ANN. § 9023e (Supp. 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-22-1 to 13-22-23 (2001 & 
Supp. 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2451 to 2479 (1993 & Supp. 2003); VA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 57-48 to 57-69 (Michie 2003 & Supp. 2004); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19-09-010 
to 19-09-915 (1999 & Supp. 2004); W. VA. CODE §§ 29-19-1 to 29-19-15b (2001 & 
Supp. 2004); WIS. STAT. §§ 440.41 to 440.48 (1998 & Supp. 2003).  Only Delaware, 
Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, South Dakota, and Wyoming have refrained 
from enacting such laws. 
 2. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17510(b) (1997 & Supp. 2004); FLA. 
STAT. ch. 496.402 (2002 & Supp. 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131F-1 (2003); PA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 10, § 162.2 (West 1999 & Supp. 2004). 
 3. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 496.402 (2002 & Supp. 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
131F-1 (2003); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 162.2 (West 1999 & Supp. 2004). 
 4. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 309.581 (2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-11-529 (1973-
2001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 552.18 (1999); PA. STAT. ANN. tit., 10 § 162.15(a)(1) 
(West 1999 & Supp. 2004). 
 5. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-190h (1994 & Supp. 2004); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 367.667 (Banks-Baldwin 2002); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 174-d (McKinney 2004); 
PA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 10, §§ 162.15(a)(3)-(13) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004). 
2
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To effect these goals, most Charitable Solicitation Acts6 require 
that charities secure a state charitable solicitation permit or license 
or otherwise register with the state prior to soliciting charitable 
contributions.7  Fortunately, thirty-three jurisdictions accept one 
form, the Unified Registration Statement8 (URS), for initial 
registrations.  Six states require charities to file different forms 
promulgated by their own administrative agencies.9  This initial 
“registration” consists primarily of a financial report and 
organizational information.  Most jurisdictions accepting the URS 
allow registrants to satisfy the financial report requirement by 
 
 6. For convenience, this article will refer to these enactments generally as 
“Charitable Solicitation Acts.”  The actual enactments themselves are variously 
entitled “Charitable Solicitations Act” (e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-16-101 (2002 & 
2003 Supp.); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-17-1 (2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, ch. 385, § 
5001 (West 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-22-1 (Michie 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-
22-1 (2001 & Supp. 2004)), “Solicitation of Contributions Act” (e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 
496, § 496.401 (2002 & Supp. 2004)), “Charitable Organizations and Solicitations 
Act” (e.g. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1759 (1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 400.271 (1997)), 
“Charitable Registration and Investigation Act” (e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 45:17A-18 
(1995 & Supp. 2004)), “Solicitation of Charitable Contributions Act” (e.g., OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 18, § 552.1 (1999)), “Solicitation of Funds for Charitable Purposes Act” 
(e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 162.1 (West 1999 & Supp. 2004)), “Solicitation of 
Charitable Funds Act” (e.g., S.C. CODE. ANN. § 33-56-10 (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 
2003); W. VA. CODE § 29-19-1 (2001 & Supp. 2004)), and other variations on the 
same theme. 
 7. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 5004.1C (West 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 131F-5(a) (2003);  PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 162.5(a) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004). 
 8. The Unified Registration Statement (URS) is a product of a collaboration 
between the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG), the National 
Association of State Charities Officials (NASCO), and the Multi-State Filer Project, 
Inc.  The URS forms and instructions can be downloaded from 
http://www.multistatefiling.org/urs_webv231.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2004) 
[hereinafter URS pdf].  The URS is accepted by Alabama, Arkansas, California, 
Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, 
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  See URS pdf at 28-37. 
 9. Alaska, Arizona, and Florida do not accept the URS.  See id. at 38.  
Colorado is the only state that requires charities to register online.  COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 6-16-110.5 (3) (2002 & Supp. 2003); 8 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1505-9.1(1) 
(2004).  Although it appears from the most recent version of the URS that both 
Oklahoma and North Carolina accept the URS form, this is not accurate.  
Oklahoma has not accepted URS forms since it adopted a new document 
management system which does not support the URS in a scanned format.  And 
North Carolina accepts either its own form or its own form plus the URS.  In other 
words, a charity must fill out the form promulgated by the Charitable Solicitation 
Licensing Section of the North Carolina Department of the Secretary of State. A 
charity may choose to fill out the URS also. 
3
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submitting a copy of their most recent IRS Form 990.10  The 
organizational information ranges from the mundane (e.g., name, 
address, and Taxpayer Identification Number) to the practical 
(e.g., the “purposes and programs of the organization”) to the 
esoteric (e.g., whether any of the organization’s directors have 
been convicted of a misdemeanor).11  In addition, many states also 
require a registration fee and submission of copies of the 
organization’s articles of incorporation, bylaws, IRS determination 
letter, and fundraising contracts.12 
This initial registration is only the beginning of the process.  
To remain in compliance, charities must make additional filings in 
each state in subsequent years.  Each state requiring registration 
also requires registered charities to make an annual financial 
report.13  Most states allow registrants to satisfy this requirement by 
simply providing a copy of the organization’s IRS Form 990.14  
However, other states require the financial information to be 
restated on separate forms promulgated by the states’ regulators.15  
 
 10. IRS Form 990 is the “informational” tax return that most nonprofits must 
file with the IRS annually.  Some states accepting the IRS Form 990 as an annual 
report also require submission of an audited financial statement depending on the 
applicant’s gross revenues in the most recent fiscal year.  See URS pdf, supra note 8, 
at 28-37.  Although Mississippi, Tennessee, and West Virginia accept the URS and 
require submission of the applicant’s most recent IRS Form 990, each of these 
states also require applicants to submit an additional financial report form.  See id. 
at 17-18, 24-26.  Among states that do not accept the URS, Alaska, Arizona, 
Colorado, and Florida accept IRS Form 990 in lieu of their own financial report 
forms.  North Carolina and Oklahoma require registrants to fill out forms 
promulgated by their administrative agencies in addition to submitting their IRS 
Form 990. 
 11. See id. at 6-8. 
 12. See id. at 43 (summarizing these requirements). 
 13. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 496.407(1) (2004); ILL. COMP. STAT. 460/4(a) 
(2004); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 172-b (McKinney 2004). 
 14. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 496.407(2) (2002 & Supp. 2004); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 367.657(3) (Banks-Baldwin 2002); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 57-49(A), 57-49(A)(6) 
(Michie 2003 & Supp. 2004).  Many states also require submission of the 
organization’s audited financial statement if the registrant’s gross revenues 
exceeded a certain level in the previous fiscal year.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
1763(c) (1995) (requiring filing of audited financial report if contributions 
exceeded $100,000 in the previous fiscal year); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 172-b(1) 
(McKinney 2004) (requiring same if gross revenues exceeded $250,000 in the 
previous fiscal year); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-101-506(b)(2)(A) (2004) (requiring 
same if gross revenues exceeded $300,000 in the previous fiscal year). 
 15. The process is complicated by the fact that the states requiring a separate 
financial report form for annual reports is not the same set of states (see supra text 
accompanying note 10) requiring one for initial registrations.  For example, New 
York does not require any financial report form besides the IRS Form 990 for an 
4
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Many states require that the registration, which details the 
organizational information, be renewed.  In most cases, the 
renewal and annual report are considered one filing.16  However, 
some states effectively require that charities file separate 
registration renewals and annual reports.17 
This entire process is further complicated by still more filings 
and by local ordinances regulating charitable solicitations.  Six 
jurisdictions require charities to engage registered agents located 
within their borders even though the charity has no contact with 
the jurisdiction other than soliciting contributions from its 
residents.18  And many jurisdictions require charities to register as 
foreign corporations19 merely because they solicit residents through 
direct mail, telemarketing, or the Internet.20  Finally, localities are 
 
initial registration, but for annual reports New York requires submission of both 
an IRS Form 990 and New York’s own form CHAR497.  N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 172-b(1) 
(McKinney 2004), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/forms/ 
char497.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2004). 
 16. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131F-5(c) (2003); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 
162.5(a)-(e) (1999 & Supp. 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 57-49 (2003 & Supp. 2004). 
 17. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-402(a)(1)(A) (Michie 2003) (requiring 
registration before solicitation; although the statute is not explicit on this point, in 
practice Arkansas issues licenses that expire after one year and must be renewed 
prior to the anniversary of the registration date); id. § 4-28-403 (requiring annual 
reports to be filed on or before May 15 of each year, although extensions are 
available and  organizations can apply for another due date if its fiscal year does 
not coincide with the calendar year); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-56-30(A) (Law. Co-op. 
1990 & Supp. 2004) (requiring organizations to “file a registration statement . . . 
by July first of each year but in all cases prior to solicitation.”); id. § 33-56-60 
(requiring organizations to “file . . . an annual report of its financial activities . . . 
within four and one-half months of the close of the organization’s fiscal year. . . .” 
although extensions are available); WIS. STAT. § 440.08(2)(a)23m (1998 & Supp. 
2003) (requiring charitable organizations to renew registrations prior to August 1, 
2004); id. § 440.42(3)(a) (requiring charitable organizations to file annual reports 
within six months of the previous fiscal year end). 
 18. The jurisdictions are the District of Columbia, Illinois, Michigan, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, and North Dakota.  See URS pdf, supra note 8, at 28-37. 
 19. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2105(a) (West 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
271B.15-010(1) (Banks-Baldwin 2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-134(1) (1999 & 
Supp. 2003). 
 20. Regulation of solicitations conducted over the Internet has been a 
nettlesome issue.  Nearly all Charitable Solicitation Acts were enacted before the 
Internet came into widespread use in the mid-to-late 1990s.  And most such Acts 
had defined “solicitation” broadly.  For example, New York defines “solicit” as 
“[t]o directly or indirectly make a request for a contribution, whether express or 
implied, through any medium.  A ‘solicitation’ shall be deemed to have taken place 
whether or not a contribution is made.” N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 171-a(10) (McKinney 
2002 & Supp. 2004) (emphasis added). Kansas defines “solicitation” as “any 
request or appeal, either oral or written, or any endeavor to obtain, seek or plead 
5
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free to enact their own charitable solicitation ordinances requiring 
registration as well;21at least four localities have already done so.22 
The various registration requirements do not conflict with 
each other.  They are, however, duplicative23 and burdensome.  
 
for funds, property, financial assistance or other thing of value. . . .” KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 17-1760(f) (1995) (emphasis added).  Tennessee defines “solicit” as “any 
oral or written request, however communicated, whether directly or indirectly, for a 
contribution.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-101-501(9) (2002 & Supp. 2003) (emphasis 
added).  Thus, even a “passive solicitation” website that merely described a 
charitable organization and allowed site visitors to donate via credit card, a private 
payment service, or other means would trigger a registration requirement under 
many state Charitable Solicitation Acts.  However, the nonprofit community and 
regulators realized that literal application of these definitions to charities’ 
webpages containing passive solicitations would likely raise numerous Due Process 
constitutional issues.  After all, even though the charities could reasonably expect 
that residents of numerous jurisdictions would access the website and perhaps 
contribute, the charities had not purposefully availed themselves of the 
jurisdictions’ markets or courts and had no other contact with it.  Under such 
circumstances, regulatory jurisdiction over the charities would be unconstitutional.  
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.  Superior Court of California, Solano County, 480 U.S. 
102, 112-14 (1987).  See also Am. Charities for Reasonable Fundraising Regulation, 
Inc. v. Pinellas County, 221 F.3d 1211, 1216-18 (11th Cir. 2000). 
  To address the issue, NASCO approved the “Charleston Principles” on 
March 14, 2001, which advises regulators on various aspects of charitable 
solicitations conducted via the Internet.  Insofar as the Charleston Principles 
addressed charitable solicitations conducted via the Internet by nonresident 
charities that would otherwise not have to register in a jurisdiction, NASCO 
essentially recommended that these charities should be compelled to register in 
that particular jurisdiction if: (a) the charity used the Internet to specifically target 
(via email or other methods) donors in that jurisdiction or (b) the charity received 
contributions from that jurisdiction on a “repeated and ongoing basis or a 
substantial basis through its Web site.”  NASCO, THE CHARLESTON PRINCIPLES § 
III.B.1 (2001), at http://www.nasconet.org/public.php?pubsec=4&curdoc=10 (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2004) [hereinafter CP Website].  It is important to remember that 
the Charleston Principles are not legally binding, but merely represent the 
“informal, nonbinding advice of the NASCO Board of Directors to NASCO 
members.” Id.  Nevertheless, thus far the author is unaware of any instance in 
which a state has repudiated the Charleston Principles either explicitly or 
implicitly since their promulgation. 
 21. Many Charitable Solicitation Acts contain provisions explicitly providing 
that the Act does not prohibit localities from enacting their own charitable 
solicitation ordinances requiring an additional layer of registration with the 
locality.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 496.421 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 367.669 (Banks-Baldwin 2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 57-63 (Michie 2003). 
 22. COLUMBUS, OHIO, CODE §§ 525.01-.23. (2004); JEFFERSON CO., KY., CODE §§ 
117.01 et seq. (2004); LOS ANGELES, CAL., CODE §§ 44.00-.15 (2004); PINELLAS CO., 
FLA., CODE §§ 42-266 to 42-344 (2004). 
 23. Not only are the various state filings duplicative of each other, they 
substantially duplicate federal law.  In order to inform the public as to how 
charitable contributions are spent, State Charitable Solicitation Acts require 
charities to file IRS Forms 990, or to file state-designed forms that largely 
6
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The net effect of all these statutes and ordinances is that the typical 
charity that solicits contributions nationwide must meet at least 
forty-two deadlines per year24 and pay $3400 to $5500 per year in 
filing fees, registered agent fees, and other direct expenses.25  
Additionally, the charity must expend significant resources on 
accountants, attorneys, and administrative staff to remain in 
compliance with each regulating jurisdiction.26  Every dollar spent 
 
rearrange data from the IRS Form 990 (for an example of an annual report form 
that merely seeks IRS Form 990 information in a different format, see Tennessee 
Form SS-6002, available at http://www.state.tn.us/sos/forms/ss-6002.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2004), which goes so far as to have line by line instructions merely 
mandating that the registrant rearrange its IRS Form 990 data in a different 
order), or to file both.  However, federal law already requires that charities 
provide copies of their IRS Forms 990 directly to the public either at their offices 
or through the mail free of charge.  Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6104(d)-1 to -3 (2004).  
Moreover, to the extent that Charitable Solicitations Acts prohibit fraud in 
charitable solicitations, they are also arguably duplicative of state and federal laws 
prohibiting fraud and false pretenses in general terms.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 
(2004); NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.375 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-178 (Michie 1996 
& Supp. 2004). 
 24. As noted above, charities must meet deadlines for renewals, annual 
reports, and registration as a foreign corporation.  The number of deadlines that a 
charity must meet varies based on where the charity solicits (for example, certain 
charities refuse to solicit in localities that require registration in addition to 
registration with the state in which the locality sits) and the various exemptions 
from registration written into state Charitable Solicitation Acts.  For example, 
different states have different minimum gross revenue thresholds before 
registration is required.  See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 162.6(a)(8) (West 1999 & 
Supp. 2004) (exempting from the registration requirement organizations 
receiving less than $25,000 in contributions annually); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-
190d(6) (1999 & Supp. 2004) (exempting organizations receiving less than 
$50,000 in contributions annually); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1762(d) (1995) 
(exempting organizations receiving less than $10,000 in contributions annually). 
 25. These expense figures are based on the author’s experience with his 
clients.  The total amount of registration expenses (excluding professional and 
administrative expenses) paid by a charity varies based upon the charity’s gross 
revenues, as several states have a sliding registration fee scale based on the 
registrant’s gross revenues. 
 26. Only part of the expenses imposed by state Charitable Solicitation Acts is 
attributable to the registration process.  These Acts also require that certain 
language appear in fundraising contracts. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 173-a 
(McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2003) (mandating that contracts between charities and 
fundraisers contain cancellation provisions and other terms); MD. CODE ANN., BUS. 
REG. § 6-501(d)(c) (Michie 1997) (mandating that agreements with parties 
engaged to process contributions be attached to fundraising contracts); PA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 10, § 162.8(d) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004) (mandating that contracts 
contain a statement of the charitable purpose for which the contributions are 
solicited and requiring certain disclosures be made during solicitations). 
  The mandatory disclosure issue can be particularly vexing.  Mandatory 
disclosures of the charity’s name and address (see, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 
7
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on registration fees, staff time, accountants, or attorneys is a dollar 
that cannot be devoted to the organization’s charitable purpose. 
II. THE FEDERAL ROLE 
Given the redundancy and complexity of regulation by states 
and localities, it would seem much more rational and efficient to 
regulate charitable solicitations at the federal level.  Although the 
Commerce Clause27 empowers the federal government to regulate 
nationwide charitable solicitations,28 Congress has not chosen to do 
so. 
To be sure, federal law controls many facets of a nonprofit 
organization’s activities.  Its very status as a tax-exempt organization 
is primarily a creature of federal income tax law.29  Federal law 
determines what contributions are tax-deductible,30 whether and in 
what form an organization’s financial activities must be released to 
the public,31 and which revenue generating activities will be taxed 
 
17510.3(a)(1) (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 496.411(2)(a) (West 2002 & Supp. 
2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 5012 (West 2004)), charitable purpose (see, e.g., 
IND. CODE § 23-7-8-6(a)(4) (West 1994 & Supp. 2004); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 174-b(2) 
(McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 309.556(1)(c) (2004)), and 
procedures to request additional information (see, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., BUS. REG. § 
6-411 (Michie 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131F-9(b)(3) (2003); W. VA. CODE § 29-19-8 
(2001 & Supp. 2004)) are not onerous.  However, various states require an 
additional disclosure statement, each informing potential donors that financial 
information is available from the respective state’s regulatory offices.  Thus, a 
national direct mail solicitation campaign must contain each appropriate 
disclosure (most statutes either explicitly or implicitly require a verbatim 
reprinting of a mandated disclosure) even though the only material variation 
between them is the regulator’s address.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 496.411(3) (2002 
& Supp. 2004); MD. CODE ANN., BUS. REG. § 6-411 (Michie 1998); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 79-11-523(3) (2003); N.J. REV. STAT. § 45:17A-38 (2003); N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, 
§§ 48-11.2(a), (d) (1995 & Supp. 2004); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 174-b.1 (McKinney 2002 
& Supp. 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131F-9(c) (2003); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 
162.13(c) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 57-55.3 (Michie 2003); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.09.100(4) (West 1998 & Supp. 2004); W. VA. CODE § 29-19-8 
(2001 & Supp. 2004). 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 28. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 
583-86 (1997).  See also Chapman v. Comm’r of Revenue, 651 N.W.2d 825, 833 
(Minn. 2002). 
 29. I.R.C. § 501(a) (1992-1998 & Supp. 2003).  See also, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
79-32, 113 (1997); MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 10-104(2) (Michie 1997); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 58.1-1 (Michie 2000). 
 30. I.R.C. § 170 (2004). 
 31. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6104(d)-1 to -3 (2004). 
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notwithstanding the organization’s tax-exempt status.32  Federal law 
even regulates specific aspects of charitable solicitation activity such 
as: 1) sweepstakes campaigns promoted through the U.S. Mail;33 
and 2) how quickly and clearly potential donors must be told which 
charitable organization is making the call and its exact purpose to 
solicit funds.34 
More importantly, federal courts have protected charities’ First 
Amendment right to solicit contributions and to engage third 
parties to do so on their behalf.35  But federal Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence may offer a means of bringing order and efficiency 
to the complicated welter of statutes, ordinances, and regulations 
currently governing charitable solicitations. 
III. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that the Commerce 
Clause does more than delegate to Congress the power to regulate 
interstate commerce; “it has a negative sweep as well.”36  “The 
negative or dormant implication of the Commerce Clause prohibits 
state . . . regulation that . . . unduly burdens interstate commerce 
and thereby ‘imped[es] free private trade in the national 
marketplace.’”37  Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence makes 
an immediate distinction between state and local statutes that 
affirmatively discriminate against interstate commerce and those 
that simply burden interstate commerce incidentally.38  As 
 
 32. I.R.C. § 501(b) (2004). 
 33. 39 U.S.C. § 3001(k) (2004). 
 34. FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iv)(e)(1)(2) 
(2004). 
 35. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781-82 (1988) 
(holding that regulations of the content of charitable solicitation messages are 
subject to “exacting First Amendment scrutiny.”); Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph 
H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 966 (1984) (reaffirming that it is a “fundamentally 
mistaken premise” for legislators to believe that “high solicitation costs are an 
accurate measure of fraud”); Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 
U.S. 620, 636 (1980) (holding that regulators cannot withhold licenses or 
implicitly label charities as fraudulent simply because they spend a certain 
percentage of their gross receipts on fundraising, salaries and overhead). 
 36. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309 (1992). 
 37. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997) (citations omitted). 
 38. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).  Those statutes that 
affirmatively discriminate against interstate commerce are virtually per se invalid.  
Id. at 148.  This principle was recently affirmed in the context of charitable 
contributions.  Chapman v. Comm’r, 651 N.W.2d 825, 834 (Minn. 2002).  The 
Chapman court held that a statute allowing tax deductions for contributions to 
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Charitable Solicitation Acts impose nearly identical regulatory 
burdens on both in-state and out-of-state charities,39 this article will 
consider these statutes only in light of the latter–-the “incidental 
burden”–-line of cases. 
The leading case in the incidental burden line of decisions is 
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,40 which sets forth the “Pike test”: 
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a 
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate 
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the 
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits.  If a legitimate local 
purpose is found, then the question becomes one of 
degree.  And the extent of the burden that will be 
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local 
interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as 
well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.41 
It is well settled that the Charitable Solicitation Acts are 
enacted to effectuate legitimate local purposes.42  In this light, the 
Pike test for Charitable Solicitation Acts is a two-part test; courts 
look to: 1) whether the burden a regulation imposes is clearly 
excessive in relation to the local benefits; and 2) whether the state 
or local interests could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on 
interstate activities.43 
Although the Pike test appears to be a simple balancing test, in 
practice it is difficult to overturn a statute under the Pike test.44  The 
 
Minnesota charities but not for contributions to non-Minnesota charities was 
facially discriminatory against interstate commerce.  Id. at 835.  The court struck 
down the statute because it did not advance a legitimate local purpose that could 
not be adequately served by reasonably nondiscriminatory alternatives.  Id. at 838. 
 39. See, e.g., Am. Target Adver., Inc. v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241, 1254 (10th Cir. 
2000).  The only conceivable disparate burden that might be born by an out-of-
state charity but not by an in-state charity is registration as a foreign corporation.  
And this burden is typically imposed by a state’s corporation code and not by its 
Charitable Solicitation Act.  See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2105(a) (West 1990 & 
Supp. 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.15-010(1) (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-
19.1-134(1) (2001). 
 40. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
 41. Id. at 142 (citation omitted). 
 42. Vill. of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 636-37 
(1980) (referring to Schaumberg’s interests in protecting the public from fraud 
and promoting residential privacy and public safety as “substantial” and 
“legitimate”). 
 43. See id. 
 44. See, e.g., Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 217 (2d Cir. 
2004) (explaining that under the Pike test an unequal burden must be shown); 
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Supreme Court itself has remarked on its own reluctance to 
invalidate under the Dormant Commerce Clause “state legislation 
in the field of safety where the propriety of local regulation has 
long been recognized.”45   
One case, though, stands out as a model for a potentially 
successful challenge to Charitable Solicitation Acts on Dormant 
Commerce Clause grounds.  In Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. 
Rice,46 the Supreme Court invalidated a trucking regulation under 
the Pike test.  The Raymond court noted that the regulation’s benefit 
was difficult to discern.  The regulation at issue prohibited sixty-five 
foot, double-trailer trucks on Wisconsin highways.47  Although 
Wisconsin argued the regulation improved highway safety, the 
plaintiff undermined that claim by producing “uncontradicted 
evidence that the difference in passing time [did] not pose an 
appreciable threat” to safety and that Wisconsin had allowed 
numerous exceptions to the vehicle length regulation.48  In 
response, Wisconsin “virtually defaulted in its defense of the 
regulations as a safety measure.”49  As for the burden, plaintiffs 
demonstrated “without contradiction” that the regulations 
increased shipping costs, slowed the movement of goods in 
interstate commerce, and limited the number of “interline 
transfers” it could accept.50  In light of the evidence adduced at 
trial, the Court held that the regulation failed the Pike test.51 
Of course, one cannot reasonably expect a regulator to fail to 
defend a Charitable Solicitation Act as Wisconsin did in Raymond.  
 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200, 207 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(characterizing the Pike test as “permissive”); Alliant Energy Corp. v. Bie, 330 F.3d 
904, 914 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding no legitimate state interest was offered to justify 
the burden on interstate commerce); Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. 
Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 83 (1st Cir. 2001) (noting that the Pike balancing test 
calls for a low level of scrutiny); Kleenwell Biohazard Waste & Gen. Ecology 
Consultants, Inc. v. Nelson, 48 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the 
party challenging a regulation must establish that the burdens the regulation 
impose clearly outweigh the local benefits). 
 45. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 443 (1978) (quoting 
Pike, 397 U.S. at 143).  N.B. Fraud prevention would likely be considered as an 
equally proper field for state legislation, if not explicitly considered as a species of 
“safety” regulation. 
 46. 434 U.S. 429 (1978). 
 47. Id. at 442 (citing WIS. STAT. § 348.07(1) (1975)). 
 48. Id. at 444-45. 
 49. Id. at 444. 
 50. Id. at 445. 
 51. Id. at 447. 
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However, a strong case can be made both that the local benefits of 
such enactments are illusory and that the burdens they impose are 
significant.  As discussed above,52 Charitable Solicitation Acts 
arguably provide no marginal local benefits.  To the extent that 
these Acts disclose to the public the purpose for which 
contributions are solicited and the manner in which contributions 
are actually used, they are essentially redundant. 
IRS Form 990 requires charities to disclose the purpose for 
which their contributions are solicited.53  And, of course, IRS Form 
990 requires explanation of exactly how contributions are spent in 
a given fiscal year.54  Most importantly, Treasury regulations 
mandate that charities make their IRS Forms 990 available to the 
public free of charge either at the charity’s office or through the 
mail.55  In light of this existing reporting and disclosure 
requirement, it is difficult to imagine what local disclosure benefit 
is added by a Charitable Solicitation Act.  It would seem that states 
allowing charities to simply file their IRS 990 Forms as an annual 
financial report56 would be particularly vulnerable to this argument.  
And while Charitable Solicitation Acts often single out particular 
solicitation acts as fraudulent,57 such acts are generally prohibited 
in general terms by broadly written criminal fraud statutes58 and by 
the common law. 
Meanwhile, the burdens imposed by Charitable Solicitation 
Acts are certainly nontrivial and difficult to dispute.  In Raymond, 
the burdens considered clearly excessive in relation to the benefits 
were increased costs for the regulated party, slowing the movement 
 
 52. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 53. See IRS Form 990, Part III (2003). 
 54. See id. Part II. 
 55. Treas. Reg. § 301.6104(d)-1(a) (2004).  Charities are allowed to charge 
reasonable expenses for photocopying and mailing.  Id. 
 56. See, e.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 9, § 12.010 (Michie 2002); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. ch. 496.407(2) (West 2002 & Supp. 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367-657 
(2002). 
 57. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1769(h) (1995) (prohibiting the use of 
donations for purposes other than those stated in solicitations); MD. CODE ANN., 
BUS. REG. § 6-607 (Michie 1998) (prohibiting use of false or materially misleading 
advertising or promotional material in connection with a charitable solicitation); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7:28-f, I(d) (2001) (prohibiting use of a name, symbol, or 
statement so closely related or similar to that used by another charitable trust that 
the use thereof would tend to confuse or mislead a solicited person). 
 58. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.375 (2001); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-178 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2004). 
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of interstate goods, and limitations on trading partners.59  
Charitable Solicitation Acts impose at least comparable burdens.  
The costs imposed by Charitable Solicitation Acts include the direct 
expenses such as registration fees and registered agent fees which 
can range from $3400 to $5500, the administrative expense of 
preparing and filing more than forty forms each year, and the 
professional fees for the attorney and accountant services necessary 
to compile the information and remain in compliance.60  Just as the 
regulation at issue in Raymond, Charitable Solicitation Acts 
routinely slow interstate commerce and place a limit on the 
number of legal trading partners.  Many states explicitly prohibit 
charities and fundraisers from contracting with each other unless 
both are registered.61  In addition to the registration requirement, 
many states also require that the parties first register their 
fundraising contracts and make other filings before any particular 
solicitation campaign can begin.62 
Certainly there is material available to make the case that “the 
burden imposed . . . is clearly excessive in relation to the putative 
local benefits” and that the “local interest involved . . . could be 
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.”63  
This is especially true since so much of the local benefit is already 
promoted by Federal regulations and existing fraud laws.64  This is 
not to say that such an argument is necessarily likely to succeed.  
Such challenges are typically disfavored65 and one such direct 
attempt has already failed in Public Citizen, Inc. v. Pinellas County.66 
In Public Citizen, the plaintiffs produced significant evidence of 
the burden that the Pinellas County ordinance placed upon 
charitable solicitation.  The plaintiffs noted that a) the ordinance 
had caused them to stop soliciting in Pinellas County and that their 
 
 59. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 445-46 (1978). 
 60. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 61. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 172.1, 172-d.10, 172-d.12, 173.1, 173-a.1 
(McKinney 2002 & Supp. 200); 10 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 162.5(a), 162.8(a) (West 
1999 & Supp. 2004); and TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-101-504(a), 48-101-507(a) (2002 
& Supp. 2003). 
 62. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 172-d.5, 172-d.6 (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 
2004); 10 PA. CONS. STAT. § 162.8(d) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 13-22-9(1)(b)(vii)(C), (D), 13-22-9(1)(b)(viii)(C), (D) (2001 & Supp. 2004); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 57-54 (Michie 2003). 
 63. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 64. See supra notes 57 and 58 and accompanying text. 
 65. See supra notes 44 and 45 and accompanying text. 
 66. 321 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (M.D. Fla. 2004). 
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commerce with that jurisdiction had “dropped off substantially”; b) 
any charity choosing not to register with the county “loses an 
opportunity to engage in interstate commerce”; c) tthe ordinance 
imposes significant compliance costs; and d) if other localities 
enacted similar ordinances “the aggregate administrative burden 
and cost would outweigh the county’s legitimate local interest.”67  
Despite the plaintiffs’ showing, the Public Citizen court held that 
“[a]lthough nothing submitted by the parties conclusively 
attributes the low number of complaints [and inquiries] to the 
ordinance’s regulatory scheme, overall the record indicates that the 
ordinance generates local putative benefits, which benefits are not 
demonstrably and clearly exceeded by the burden imposed on 
interstate commerce.”68  The ordinance was upheld under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause because “the county cannot promote 
the ordinance’s purpose ‘with a lesser impact on interstate 
activities.’  The alternative, either no regulation or a regulation 
targeted at in-state organizations, would defeat the ordinance’s 
legitimate goal.”69 
This line of attack against the Pinellas ordinance might have 
been bolstered by the argument that the local benefit was entirely 
illusory in light of existing federal regulations and state fraud laws.70  
After all, is there truly a local benefit provided when the county 
merely provides to the public a copy of the charity’s IRS Form 990 
that is already available from the Florida Department of Agriculture 
and Consumer Services71 and from the charity itself?72  The trucking 
regulation in Raymond was overturned in a similar fashion when the 
plaintiff in that case undermined the rhetorical potency of the 
highway safety measure by pointing out that Wisconsin’s truck 
length limit was riddled with exceptions.73  Even though challenges 
under the Pike test rarely succeed, it may be useful to point out that 
the choice is not necessarily between regulation and no regulation 
at all as the Public Citizen court conceived the question, but rather 
 
 67. Id. at 1308. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. The purpose of the Pinellas County ordinance was to “prevent deception, 
fraud, or misrepresentation in the solicitation, use and reporting of 
contributions.”  PINELLAS COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 42-270 (cited in Public Citizen, 321 
F. Supp. 2d at 1280).  This purpose is duplicative, as indicated supra at note 23. 
 71. FLA. STAT. chs. 496.407(2), 119.01 (2004).  
 72. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6104(d)-1 to 3 (2004). 
 73. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 442-44 (1978). 
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between adequate regulation and redundant regulation. 
Additional useful jurisprudence may be available from the 
Bellas Hess—Quill74 line of cases.  These cases provide two 
potentially useful themes.  The first is a bright line rule prohibiting 
the regulation of interstate commerce where the regulated entity’s 
only connection with the state is by common carrier or the U.S. 
mail.75  This is particularly attractive because many charities only 
have contact with most states by virtue of direct mail solicitations, 
Internet solicitations, or telemarketing solicitations.  This argument 
was unsuccessfully used in a challenge to the Utah Charitable 
Solicitation Act under the Dormant Commerce Clause.76  The 
Tenth Circuit rejected the argument, saying that the Bellas Hess–
Quill rule was only a “bright line rule in the area of sales and use 
taxes.”77  Although this reasoning comes from a federal Court of 
Appeals and appears persuasive, it is unclear what principle justifies 
evaluating tax laws and non-tax laws differently under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause and rejecting normal legal reasoning by analogy.  
In fact, in Pike the Court freely considered tax cases78 as precedent 
in deciding the non-tax issue before it.79 
The second line of reasoning from the Bellas Hess–Quill cases 
justifies invalidating statutes on the grounds that, if left unchecked, 
the cumulative effect of states and localities enacting statutes and 
ordinances could produce a regulatory morass.  One of the reasons 
the Bellas Hess court cited in overturning the Illinois use tax was 
that 
[i]f Illinois can impose such burdens, so can every other 
[s]tate, and so, indeed, can every municipality, every 
school district, and every other political subdivision 
throughout the Nation with the power to impose sales and 
use taxes.  The many variations in rates of tax, in allowable 
exemptions, and in administrative and record-keeping 
 
 74. Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967); 
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) 
 75. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758-59; Quill, 504 U.S. at 311-13. 
 76. See Am. Target Adver. v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 77. Id. at 1255 (citing Quill, 504 U.S. at 316). 
 78. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 141 (1970) (discussing the 
applicability of Fed. Compress & Warehouse Co. v. McLean, 291 U.S. 17 (1934) 
and Chassaniol v. City of Greenwood, 291 U.S. 584 (1934)). 
 79. Pike, 397 U.S. at 141.  The Pike court found these cases to be inapposite on 
the facts, but made no mention that the legal reasoning from their opinions was 
inherently inapplicable to a non-tax case evaluated under the Dormant Commerce 
Clause.  Id. 
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requirements could entangle [the plaintiff’s] interstate 
business in a virtual welter of complicated obligations to 
local jurisdictions with no legitimate claim to impose ‘a 
fair share of the cost of the local government.’80 
Given the complicated nature of charitable solicitation 
regulation today–-with forty-three state regulatory regimes, at least 
four localities seeking to enforce their ordinances on national 
fundraising campaigns, and additional regulation from the federal 
government for certain aspects of charitable solicitation–-it would 
seem to be the feared “welter of complicated obligations to local 
jurisdictions.”  If the Bellas Hess admonition to consider the 
cumulative effect of state and local regulation were to apply to any 
regulatory arena, this would most likely be it. 
Of course, this argument too would be countered with an 
insistence that cumulative effect evaluation should apply only to tax 
laws.  But, as noted above, it is unclear that such strict 
interpretational rules were meant to apply to Dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence.  Moreover, in Quill the Court argued that the 
entire point of Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is to 
prohibit “discrimination against interstate commerce . . . and [bar] 
state regulations that unduly burden interstate commerce.”81  
Regulation is just as likely to burden and discriminate against 
interstate commerce as is taxation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The current charitable solicitation regulatory regime in the 
United States is complicated.  It appears clear that this system is far 
more complicated and redundant than is necessary to accomplish 
its most commonly stated goals: informing the public as to the 
charitable purposes for which solicitations are being made, 
informing the public as to how the proceeds of charitable 
solicitations are being spent, and protecting the public from 
fraudulent solicitations.  And while it would appear from a cursory 
reading of Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence that this 
mélange of different reporting forms, deadlines, fees, disclosures, 
and contract requirements is precisely the situation that the 
Framers sought to avoid when they established a common market 
 
 80. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 759-60.  See also Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.6; Healy v. 
Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989); U & I Sanitation v. City of Columbus, 
205 F.3d 1063, 1069 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 81. Quill at 312 (citations omitted). 
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among the states, it has cropped up nonetheless. 
There are numerous reasons why the Dormant Commerce 
Clause has not been successfully invoked to bring about a more 
uniform regulatory system.  Courts have been reluctant to apply 
jurisprudence from tax cases to non-tax cases.  Legislators and 
jurists nearly universally respect the legislative purposes behind the 
various Charitable Solicitation Acts.  Legislators and jurists are apt 
to consider the regulatory burdens to be minor, particularly when 
analyzing one act at a time.  And perhaps most importantly, the 
litigation environment does not favor challenges under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause. 
Charities are averse to litigation in general.  While it is 
expensive to comply with the various Charitable Solicitation Acts, it 
is more expensive to litigate.  Charities are also unwilling to risk 
their reputations by challenging a statute meant to prohibit fraud 
in charitable solicitations.  And finally, the most successful litigation 
against Charitable Solicitation Acts has been brought under the 
First Amendment, which has focused attention away from other 
avenues of attack. 
Yet it seems that Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
was intended to prevent regulatory systems of precisely this nature.  
The jurisprudential foundations for a successful challenge to this 
regulatory monstrosity are already in place.  The facts and 
arguments demonstrating the burdens imposed by this system are 
not difficult to assemble.  The difficulty comes in finding willing 
plaintiffs and in convincing courts that the benefits of these 
enactments are illusory in light of other laws and therefore that 
these local interests can “be promoted as well with a lesser impact 
on interstate activities.”82 
 
 
82      See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (discussed supra note 
41 and accompanying text). 
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